Diplomacy and Conflict • Guerrilla Warfare
The war's immediate catalyst was the murder of three rubber plantation managers in Perak, Malaya, on June 16, 1948. Two days later the British high commissioner, Sir Edward Gent, declared a state of emergency. The MCP guerrillas in the mobile corps committed the murders three months after the party had called for an armed insurrection against British rule. The conflict was called an "emergency" for economic reasons, as London insurance companies would only cover property losses to Malayan rubber and tin estates during riot or commotion in an emergency but not in an armed insurrection or civil war.
The Malayan Emergency was rooted primarily in postwar economic and political dislocations in Malaya. Despite the importance of these local factors, however, the predominant explanation for both the origins of the insurgency and the British determination to defeat it was the Cold War paradigm of communist containment. The inaugural conference of the Cominform in September 1947 and the Calcutta conference of the Indian Communist Party in February 1948, which adopted Andrei Zhdanov's two-camps thesis, were presumed to be linked to the armed rebellions against colonial rule in Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines.
Britain coveted its role in Southeast Asia, as it relied on the region for both economic and strategic reasons. Britain's massive military commitment to defeat the insurgency (by October 1950 nearly 50,000 British troops were deployed) at a time of severe postwar fiscal austerity had a significant economic dimension. After the World War II Japanese defeat in 1945, the British were determined to return to Malaya, and Malaya's dollar-earning potential made British control over its colonial possession absolutely essential. In dollar terms, rubber sales exceeded in total value all other domestic exports from Great Britain to the United States. Interruption of that supply would inflict significant damage to the British economy. When the insurgency commenced, Britain was struggling to maintain the value of its currency. This made earnings from the Sterling Area, of which Malaya was the linchpin, all the more vital. Crushing the insurgency would ensure the maintenance of British economic interests.
But the insurrection was not easy to quell. Initially, the British response was fitful, uncertain, and inept. Not until 1950, when Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs became director of operations, did the British initiate a more systematic and coordinated approach to the crisis. Britain's new program, in which the insurgents were detached from their supply sources and their support bases, provided a key breakthrough in the rebellion. Through a major relocation process, which prefigured the American policy of strategic hamlets in the Republic of Vietnam (ROV, South Vietnam), more than half a million Chinese squatters living near guerrilla areas were moved into 450 so-called New Villages. The villages hampered MCP operations and increased their vulnerability to the military operations of British-controlled security forces.
This population control, initiated by Briggs, was harsh but effective. It was prosecuted even more vigorously by General Sir Gerald Templer, who was appointed high commissioner with full powers over the military, police, and civilian authorities in early 1952. Templer also fought the counterinsurgency on other fronts. He developed an efficient, synchronized, and expanded intelligence apparatus; invented and implemented the concept of hearts and minds; enlarged the intelligence budget so that informers could be paid; and coordinated the use of sophisticated black propaganda and psyops by MI6 personnel.
Aerial warfare was refined as well. Safe conduct passes accompanied by promises of monetary rewards were airdropped to encourage or accelerate defections. Aerial drops of millions of strategic leaflets, such as handwritten letters and photographs from surrendered guerrillas, were used in conjunction with voice aircraft to personalize propaganda. British aircraft also dropped 1,000-pound bombs, chemical defoliants, and napalm on MCP jungle camps.
By 1954, when Templer departed, these measures had transformed the conflict. The insurgents had been forced back into the jungle, where they struggled to sustain themselves. In 1955 the MCP offered, in vain, to negotiate a settlement. In 1957, upon Malaya's independence, the insurgency lost its motive as a war of colonial liberation. In 1958, after mass defections, the MCP demobilized, and by 1960 the movement was limited to a small nucleus hiding on the Malayan–Thai border, from which it conducted hit-and-run raids along the northern Malay Peninsula for the next 25 years. A final peace settlement was signed on December 2, 1989.
The Malayan Emergency cast a long shadow over the new nation. Its mythology has come to dominate the modern history of Malaya, and it became a benchmark of the Cold War in Southeast Asia. For Americans embarking on military involvement in Vietnam and wishing to apply successful British strategies, the Malayan Emergency became the quintessential counterinsurgency primer.
Harper, T. N. The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; Peng, Chin. Alias Chin Peng: My Side of History. Singapore: Media Masters, 2003; Ramakrishna, Kumar. Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds, 1948–1958. London: Curzon, 2002.
Deery, Phillip. "Malayan Emergency: Cold War." World at War: Understanding Conflict and Society, ABC-CLIO, 2019, worldatwar.abc-clio.com/Search/Display/1729940. Accessed 21 Apr. 2019.
Entry ID: 2180538